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Abstract
Advances in personal communications devices including smartphones, are enabling individuals to establish and
form virtual communities in cyberspace. Such platforms now allow users to be in continuous contact, enabling
them to receive information in real time, which allows them to act in support of other members of their network.
This paper will discuss some of the capabilities afforded by social media to protest groups focused on civil
disobedience. Direct action protests are now a common sight at gatherings of world leaders, most notably the
meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle in 1999, the G20 meetings in Melbourne in 2006
and Toronto in 2010. Facebook and Twitter are becoming recognised as key mediums from which to drive
change, exert influence and strategically and tactically outmaneuver conventional police deployments at
protests. Police charged with managing protest activity now need to operate in both the physical and cyber
worlds simultaneously.
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INTRODUCTION
Social media is continually evolving and it is becoming the primary communications medium within some
segments of the community. The pervasiveness of the Internet and ready access to such has resulted in the
formation of networked communities in cyberspace. According to Boyd & Ellison (2007) social networking
sites enable participants to effectively portray their existing social networks in cyberspace. This paper uses the
term ‘social media’ to describe any web based platform that meets the criteria assigned by Boyd & Ellison
(2007, p.1) that enables participants to, “construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system,
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections
and those made by others within the system”.
These platforms include but are not limited to, Facebook, Twitter, online chat rooms, blogs, Internet relay chat
(IRC) and Windows Live Messenger. One such platform is Facebook, which currently provides for a global
forum whereby in excess of 750 million users are actively participating and sharing information, some 250
million of these are accessing it via mobile devices (Facebook, 2011). The social networking juggernaut created
by Mark Zuckerberg has permeated all strata of contemporary society. People are communicating more openly
and frequently than any time in our previous history. The opportunities provided by social media are well
understood by protestors, who are using it at an unprecedented level.
This paper will discuss some of the inherent challenges created by social media due to its adoption by direct
action protest groups, focused on civil disobedience in pursuance of their objectives. Facebook and Twitter are
now becoming recognised as key mediums from which to drive change, exert influence and strategically and
tactically outmaneuver conventional police deployments at protests.

LAWFUL PROTEST & ACTIVISM
Gelber (2009) asserts the pivotal role of peaceful protest in an open and democratic society, as crucial to the
expression of free speech and the involvement by the individual in the democratic process. A recent review of
public order policing by the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) in the UK reinforced the role
of the police to provide safety and maintain the peace (HMIC, 2009, p.5). According to Gelber (2009, p.1) a
protest is defined as, “a politically expressible, collective gathering in a public place”. Such gatherings are
protected under Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Australia is a
party. Article 21 states:
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The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised. No restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others
(United Nations, 1966, p.6).
Whilst this covenant clearly recognises the importance of lawful protest and asserts the rights to participate in
such, it also expressly provides for the maintenance of public order and safety. Clearly the inference could be
made that the United Nations (UN) was of the view that both could co-exist. The legal right to protest contains
inherent restraints designed to provide for the safety and welfare of all (HMIC, 2011). Protest action of varying
degrees is now a common sight at most gatherings of world leaders, however some are becoming increasingly
violent and confrontational. According to Sharp (2003, p.7) protestors using non violent tactics can be classified
into three groups, the first is those carrying out protest activity in a lawful manner in order to gain publicity for
their cause in an endeavor to effect change. This can include dressing in a certain manner, distributing material
or participating in marches or rallies. The second group utilises noncooperation and ceases contact with existing
networks, or establishes new ones in pursuance of their goals. The last group undertakes direct action whereby
they engage in conduct designed to affect the operations those they target. Tactics can include, blocking access
to office space, occupying the space itself, interfering with traffic flow and attaching themselves to equipment.
Sharp (2003) strongly advocates that adopting a non violent methodology does not translate to a lack of action,
but that any that is undertaken is done so within that framework.
One of the more visible groups emerging from the meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle
in 1999 is the anarchist movement. The ‘Battle in Seattle’ as it is often referred to was event that some protest
groups still use as a benchmark and template for future activities. According to material taken from the pro
anarchist website Jura, anarchists assert their right to direct action, which they define as, “...action taken by
everyday people to cause immediate problems for the rulers of our lives. This might include striking, sabotaging
forestry equipment, or damaging property” (Jura, 2011). Anarchist elements damaging property belonging to
multi national corporations and conducting acts of violence are often the focus of police attention and action at
protests. Scenes of confrontation with police were broadcast globally from the Group of Twenty (G20) meetings
in Melbourne in 2006 and Toronto in 2010. Due to police surveillance of these anarchists by CCTV and other
means, they now seek to disguise themselves whilst participating in criminal acts, clearly believing this
minimises their chances of prosecution due to their identity not being readily discernable.
The WTO, G20 and G8 protests are now a regular focus of the most violent of the anarchist entities, including
the group referred to as the Black Bloc. The activities of the Black Bloc are not always condoned by other
protesters and can lead to significant tensions within the loose amalgamation of interests represented. During the
Battle in Seattle in 2009, there are divergent views and the Black Bloc (N30) complained to other activists via a
communiqué issued on the 4th December 1999 about the, “racism of privileged activists” (N30 Black Bloc,
1999, p.2). N30 attempted to minimise their culpability, espousing the view that any action taken by the police
was not linked in any way to their actions. N30 also stated that the acts undertaken by their members were more
productive than, “any giant puppets or sea turtle costumes” (N30 Black Bloc, 1999, p.2) would ever be.

ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGY
Protestors are recognised as early adaptors of technology. They have embraced the use of social media sites like
Facebook and Twitter, drawing upon the ability of these platforms to amplify their voices and organise their
activities. Inherent risks of this approach identified by Papic and Noonan (2011) include the loss of control and
direction of the movement by the protest leadership and the potential to loose older members and their
experience, as they are not as technically adept as the newer younger members. According to Rawlinson (2009)
the use of social media by protestors continues the tradition of embracing new technology to broadcast their
message, and it is seen as a platform from which to drive change. Groups can now interact and assemble at
levels never before achievable. Rawlinson (2009) identifies the challenges facing police adopting a defensive
posture, against groups utilising a networked highly flexible structure.
Advances in technology now provide access to social media platforms to anyone with a smartphone capable of
accessing the Internet. The anonymity afforded by the Internet empowers individuals and groups to promote
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worldviews and actions, inconsistent with the norms of civil society. The ubiquity of smartphones including the
Apple iPhone 4 provides ready access to social media via an intuitive interface. Increasingly capable integrated
cameras embed geographical data into photos prior to their uploading into websites. Valli and Hannay (2010)
have identified that this GPS data is now embedded in digital images and social media updates by default. The
data embedded in the file image includes the latitude and longitude data located within the Exchangeable Image
File Format (EXIF). Whilst sites like Facebook strip the EXIF data from photos uploaded to that site, those
posed on blogs or emailed often still contain this information. Whilst it can be retrieved from the mobile phone
or sim card at a later stage by law enforcement, it enables protestors to geographically tag material they film,
edit and upload to social media sites.
In order to gain the requisite media coverage protestors understand they need to create situations that will
produce newsworthy footage. To achieve this they study the tactics used by police and the physical environment
where the protest will occur. Protestors may utilise communications mediums like Twitter in an endeavor to
outmaneuver police and rapidly mobilise at specific locations to achieve set objectives. This ability to maneuver
allows them to concentrate their greatest numbers at the areas where the police cordons are the weakest. Once
protesters identify weaknesses in police formations this information can be sent to all other activists involved,
allowing for rapid mobilisation and penetration of the police lines.
Police resources are often deployed to restrict access to venues, and key ingress and egress routes. Once the
protesters identify these routes they seek to disrupt them and attempt to engage in lock on type activities,
whereby they seek to immobilise delegates vehicles or close key intersections and draw out police resources into
direct confrontation. In order to achieve this protestors require numbers, a challenge identified by Sander (2011,
p.1) who acknowledges that there is a significant difference between cyber protests where discussion ensues and
communities are formed, to the physical attendance at a protest. The ability to put people out in the street in
sufficient numbers to achieve their aims is crucial to protest organisers. According to Risley (2010) this is where
the true value of Twitter resides, as it provides the ability to instantly draw upon the collective power of others
by reaching out to them though cyberspace.

RISE OF THE HACKTIVIST
The use of social media by activists is subject to discussion by Kahn & Kellner (2004), who detail its use to
promote networks and facilitate the management of large scale events. They further advocate that it can be used
to address oppressive oversight by governments, thereby allowing for the creation of new relationships and
systems of government to form.
The pubic now have access to information previously only accessible to governments, intelligence agencies, and
multi-national corporations. Kahn & Kellner (2004) assert that this is leading to a culture of cyber activists,
empowered by the tools provided to them by the hacker counter culture. The synthesis of hacker and activist has
resulted in the coining of the term ‘hacktivist’ and it is these individuals or groups who compile and provide
open source code and software to enable activists to mobilise, and communicate. The resultant networks of
interconnected activists are able to access and instantaneously share information with others, regardless of their
physical location. Smartphones provide video editing and upload capability directly to sites like You Tube,
enabling activists to broadcast their message to a potentially global audience in real time. This link can then be
broadcast by Twitter and Facebook and if picked up can surpass conventional media entities in terms of reach
and influence (Salmond, 2010, p.98).
Kahn & Kellner (2004) posit that the government will attempt to monitor the activities of activists, citing
acknowledged U.S. government programs including Carnivor and Echelon as proof. They are highly supportive
of the hacktivist endeavors to negate this intrusive surveillance through the provision of tools to enable private
communications remain just that. Activists with journalistic skills can utilise these tools to promote their cause
via online blogs, advocating their views as free of restriction and corporate imposed limitations. The use of
blogs allows like minded individuals to gather in cyberspace and discuss issues relevant to them in real time.
Debates are no longer restricted by accessibility and people can form global communities to address key issues.
Salmond (2010, p.90) identifies that social change is often facilitated by an increase in technology. Whilst he
also cautions against its use as a tool for restricting personal latitude, he acknowledges that increases in
interconnectivity are facilitating momentary communities to form. He postulates that such gatherings result from
49

Proceedings of the 2nd International Cyber Resilience Conference

a uniting of common desires or achievements. Such a movement could be subject to monitoring were it not
utilising hacktivist technology tools to limit its discernable signature and interception in cyberspace (Salmond,
2010, p.90).
The ability for policing agencies to access real time information and discern future intentions of protestors is
recognised by Apps (2011), who asserts positive outcomes if undertaken correctly. These would include the
ability to identify unrest and engage in dialogue prior to any protest or direct action being undertaken. Police
operating under intense scrutiny seek to utilise technology and develop tactics to address the operational
challenges inherent in unlawful protest. The legitimate rule of law may be brought into question by the adoption
and implementation of tactics that can be perceived as provocative or unlawful. In 2011 the tactics adopted by
the police during the G20 protests in London included containment areas, where protestors were enclosed by
police lines and prevented from moving or leaving. These tactics are referred to as ‘kettling’ and have resulted
in public debate regarding their actual or perceived lawfulness. Protesters have adapted to this shift in police
tactics by developing a software platform called SUKEY (2011), that enables protesters to share and access
information regarding police tactics and deployments in real time via their smartphone.
The use of the SUKEY platform was well reported in the UK media (Kingsley, 2011) including screenshots
showing the disposition of police assets including, horses and dog teams utilising Google maps in real time
(Student Protesters, 2011). SUKEY is not a completely automated system and is reliant upon a core group of
protestors utilising a number of open source feeds to assess data transmitted from the incident scene. This is then
validated prior to transmission, in an endeavor to negate misinformation being disseminated. This platform was
devised in the UK and was originally configured for London, but the writers have indicated their intention to
release the source code (Sukey, 2011). Once released local hacktivists will be able to modify it to suit any
geographic area of protest and this will provide them with the potential capability to dominate the protest space
by out maneuvering the police, because unlike open source feeds like Twitter this platform is designed to defeat
attempts at monitoring (Sukey, 2011).
When interviewed about the challenges police face in responding to protester’s use of social media by The
Guardian, the president of the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Sir Hugh Orde stated that it
brings, “a whole new dimension to public order” (Hill, 2011). Orde also identified that police struggle to keep
pace with the speed of events facilitated via the Internet. Protests that used to take two months to organise can
now be mobilised within 48 hours, presenting significant challenges for the police who need to adjust staffing
levels in time to meet the operational demands for the event, whilst maintaining business continuity.
Stagg and Warren (Stagg & Warren, 2002, p.290) identified the capability of individuals or cells to synthesise
their capabilities in an asymmetric manner when confronting adversaries. This approach is well understood by
the hacktivists who recently responded to arrests of members of the hacker collective, ‘Anonymous’ by Spanish
police. They conducted a Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) on the Spanish police server rendering it
unable to be accessed. This was reported via various mainstream media entities including The Australian (News
Core, 2011) citing a police source as confirming the event. A key theme emerges from the Anonymous
collective in a posting claiming responsibility for this attack:
DDoSing is an act of peaceful protest on the Internet. The activity is no different than
sitting peacefully in front of a shop denying entry. Just as is the case with peaceful
protest… Arresting somebody for taking part in a DDoS attack is exactly like arresting
somebody for attending a peaceful demonstration in their hometown. Annonymous
believes this right to peacefully protest is one of the fundamental pillars of any
democracy….
(Anonymous, 2011).
It can clearly be discerned from this posting that the hacktivist collective view their activities and subsequent
culpability akin to those who partake in non violent physical protests. According to media reports including The
Sydney Morning Herald (Moss & Grubb, 2011) a splinter group has emerged from Anonymous called Lulzsec,
who claim to have taken down a number of high profile websites, including one associated to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the public website belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Other
attacks by the group have focused on law enforcement including the UK’s Serious and Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA). Lulzsec have posted details of these attacks on their website (http://lulzsecurity.com/). The Australian
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newspaper reported that Australia’s major telecommunications provider Telstra was reticent to implement an
Internet filter, due to concerns that it could make the organisation a target for the group (Colley, 2011).
The potential exists for protesters to synthesise these cyber capabilities with their physical protests and target
either an organisation or event from multiple fronts simultaneously. Software platforms like SUKEY have
demonstrated an innovative approach to countering police public order tactics during protests. Whilst these
platforms do not yet possess an offensive capability, it is possible for policing operations to be significantly
disrupted by the active targeting of police networks and servers. Groups like Lulzsec seek to raise their profile
by conducting attacks on highly visible oranisations. The threat is that the policing organisations endeavoring to
manage protests could be actively targeted. The majority of contemporary policing agencies are reliant upon
web based command and control software, which could be adversely effected by a reduction in network
connectivity and availability. Stagg and Warren (2002, p.290) illuminate the inherent risks created by the
continued integration and reliance upon cyber based command and control elements, and the growing
sophistication of the adversaries who seek to exploit them.

EMPOWERMENT
The technology embraced by protesters provides them with a significant operational capability. According to
material from protest websites (@ndy, 2010) a network based approach to planning, sharing information and
ideas was adopted prior to the WEF protests in Melbourne in 2000. Sullivan and Elkus (2009, p.2) expand upon
the work of Dr Robert Bunker (1998) identifying the multi-dimensional nature of the operational space police
now operate within. The most overlooked of these according to Sullivan and Elkus (2009, p.2) is cyberspace,
which whilst temporal in nature can have significant impact in the real world. It is thus a highly sought, but
often misinterpreted aspect of modern policing. Operational command and control of contemporary police
deployments is achieved via cyberspace (Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p.3) and is therefore susceptible to attacks
against networks, adversely effecting cogitative decisions made by police commanders. It could be argued that
this capability enables the protestors to effectively get inside the police decision making loop, thereby enabling
them to outmaneuver the police and retain the initiative. This decision making loop was developed by Colonel
John Boyd a former fighter pilot with the U.S. Air Force, who used it to explain the success rate of American
fighter pilots during the Korean War (Brehmer, 2010). The initial loop is simply referred to as the OODA loop
and refers to Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. Boyd later enhanced this loop and expanded by adding key
influences that related to each area. The strategy of Boyd sought to inhibit the decision making process of the
adversary, by seeking to operate inside their cognitive processes.
According to Harland, Shanahan and Bewick (2004, p.2), “The future network enabled force will be composed
of highly responsive, well integrated and flexible joint force elements that possess the ability to conduct effects
based operations”. It could be argues that the modern activist seeks to operate within this space. This is
supported by Salmon (Salmond, 2010, p.95) who asserts that this new momentary community is a form of smart
mob and, “can be seen to be issue based, idealistic and ultimately intelligent”. The synthesis of thought across
traditional physical boundaries allows these activists to remain connected and informed via social media groups.
This results in a flatter more decentralized structure where power is vested in the individual, which makes the
group significantly harder for police to deal with, as there is no discernable leadership. This intelligent network
can also adapt to changing police tactics and rapidly dissipate and reform where and as required to achieve a
specific purpose. This provides them with the capability to outmaneuver a reactive police element attempting to
monitor their activities.
Sullivan and Elkus (2009, p.5) concur with Heal (2010) that any police commander attempting to operate purely
in the physical space will render themselves vulnerable to attacks originating from cyberspace. The police
commander is tasked with negating risks and physical protection of a venue or individual, whilst simultaneously
facilitating lawful protest activity. The defensive nature of this role results in their posture being highly visible
to an adversary, who can attempt to discern their strategy based upon their deployment. This supports Boyd’s
assertion of the importance of obtaining insight into the mind of your adversary and disrupting their thought
process by denying them the opportunity to gain or regain the initiative.
Papic and Noonan (2011) also identify the elevation of social media by political commentators in facilitating
contemporary unrest. They posit that the prevailing view is one of difficulty for dictatorships to retain control of
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a networked and informed community. Whilst social media enables protestors to compete with governments and
coordinate and mobilise at very low cost, such medium is dependent upon a technically astute leadership, who
can transfer online involvement into physical commitment in the real world. Protests that go beyond activism
and directly challenge the ruling government like Egypt can disseminate their message by social media in an
effort to counteract the usually government controlled or influenced conventional media. Messages regarding
protests and timings can be rapidly transmitted with minimal warning for government security forces to react.
Papic and Noonan (2011, p.2) detail the numbers attending the 28 January 2011 protest in Egypt taken from that
group’s Facebook page as 89,250.
The resultant shut down of the Internet by the Egyptian government illustrated the gravity of the perceived
threat and the tacit acknowledgement of the inherent power that resides within social media. This decision
however did not stop the protest, which it could be argued had already reached critical mass and only served to
further antagonise the population. In addition it denied the government an extremely valuable intelligence
opportunity as the communications medium had to be open to reach everyone and therefore information
pertaining to planned activities could be accessed, evaluated and countered. Papic and Noonan (2011, p.3) posit
that the arrest of some of the leadership group in Egypt could be attributed to their involvement in the Facebook
site. Evangelista (2011) identifies the nexus between those who organised the protests in Egypt and their
understanding of the capabilities of social media. According to Evangelista protesters involved in the uprising in
Egypt have attributed their success to the ability to organise and broadcast their message via Facebook.

CONCLUSION
The widespread adoption of social media by the protest community has enabled it to become a significant
platform from which to challenge the status quo. It provides protestors with the capability to broadcast their
message to the wider mainstream community in a manner not previously possible. In addition protestors can
now organise events with minimal lead time, thereby challenging policing agencies tasked with managing their
activities. Decisions to limit the Internet or to deny access completely like those taken by the Egyptian
government carry significant corporate risk, as most commercial and public sector entities are dependent upon
web based communications. The inherent challenge for policing organisations identified by HMIC (2011, p.9) is
to assimilate the knowledge from major events and apply it to the rapidly changing operational environment.
This needs to be achieved in a timely manner to ensure it remains relevant and effective.
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